Дефолт россии: Дефолт 1998 года в России: причины, хронология, последствия. Справка

Риск дефолта российского госдолга вырос до максимума за четыре года Экономический кризис в России 1998 года Фото Метелицы Сергея / Фотохроника ТАСС

Стоимость страховки от дефолта России выросла в пять раз. Но до критического уровня еще далеко

Стоимость страховки от дефолта России — спред пятилетнего кредитного дефолтного свопа (credit default swaps, CDS) — за последние четыре недели резко выросла, достигнув уровня весны 2016 года, свидетельствуют данные терминала Bloomberg. Она взлетела почти в пять раз, с 60 до 296 базисных пунктов. 

Кредитный дефолтный своп (CDS) — это контракт, страхующий вложения инвестора в долговые бумаги от возможного дефолта их эмитента. А спред CDS — это годовая «премия», которую выплачивает покупатель контракта его продавцу в обмен на страховку. Чем выше «премия», тем выше вероятность дефолта. Соответственно, спред 5-летних CDS на российский долг отражает, сколько готовы заплатить инвесторы в российский валютный долг, чтобы застраховаться от дефолта страны на ближайшие пять лет. Именно через этот инструмент инвесторы оценивают кредитный риск страны. Как правило, спреды CDS рассчитываются как определенный процент от рыночной стоимости страхуемых инвестором бумаг.

В конце февраля за то, чтобы застраховаться от риска дефолта России, инвесторы были готовы платить 60 б.п., то есть 0,6% от номинала своих вложений в российские бумаги. Сейчас же эта цена резко выросла — до 296 б.п., или 2,96%, объясняет основатель индексной компании «Бета финансовые технологии» Арарат Мкртчян. 

«Традиционно эти контракты рассматриваются как мера странового риска, поэтому значительное расширение спредов указывает на существенный рост риска дефолта страны», — указывает главный стратег «Атона» Александр Кудрин. 

Мкртчян уверяет, что это пока не критические показатели и что для кризисного состояния стоимость страховки должна дойти до 15-20%. Во время кризиса 2008 года этот показатель на пике в сентябре взлетел выше 10%, следует из данных терминала Bloomberg. В январе 2015 года — в разгар предыдущего валютного кризиса в России — он находился на уровне 6%. 

Чего боятся инвесторы

Стоимость страховки от дефолта (спреды CDS) росли во всех без исключения развивающихся странах на фоне массированных распродаж практически по всем классам активов, говорит Кудрин. 

При этом Россия показывает не худший рост. Так, если с начала года стоимость страховки от дефолта России, Индонезии и Мексики выросла на 150-175 б.п., то спред по турецким контрактам вырос на 235 б.п., указывает Кудрин.

Рост спредов CDS указывает в первую очередь на риски России, связанные с ценами на нефть и долларовой ликвидностью, говорит Арарат Мкртчян. «Если нефть падает, у России платежеспособность в долларах падает. Инвесторы сейчас бегут не только из акций в облигации, но и из отдельных регионов. Движение выше 200 пунктов показывает, что некоторые инвесторы стали сбрасывать российские долларовые облигации, при этом не только государственные, но и корпоративные», — объясняет Мкртчян. Учитывая динамику цен на нефть, очевидно, что у России будут проблемы с сальдо текущих платежей, с платежным балансом, а у компаний возникнут сложности с выплатами долгов, соглашается заместитель генерального директора ИК «ВЕЛЕС Капитал» Евгений Шиленков. 

Кудрин считает, что рост страновой риск-премии, возможно, был чрезмерным. По его мнению, падение цен на нефть и прочие неблагоприятные внешние факторы, безусловно, ослабляют финансовую позицию российского правительства, но вероятность дефолта по внешнему долгу выглядит минимальной. 

«Совокупный объем еврооблигаций правительства России в обращении составляет всего $40,7 млрд, около 7% от объема международных резервов ЦБ и менее 2,5% ВВП. То есть «объектов страхования» на рынке совсем немного и власти имеют достаточный ресурс для безупречного обслуживания долгов», — указывает Кудрин

«Ускорение вниз получили все активы — от рискованных облигаций нефтяных компаний до традиционно защитного золота. Все, «собрав чемоданы», подались на юг. И это нормально для того состояния ажитации и эсхатологического исступления, в котором находятся СМИ и инвесторы. Но, честно признаться, как российский CDS по 60 пунктов отдавал некоторым пижонством, так и нынешние 290 пунктов — это слишком много», — указывает управляющий активами УК «Открытие» Дмитрий Космодемьянский. 

Стоимость страховки от дефолта будет расти и дальше, пока не закончится паника, добавляет Космодемьянский. «Мы рекомендуем смириться с некоторой просадкой и начинать заходить (покупать активы) по текущим уровням. Это касается как рублевых и долларовых облигаций, так и рынка акций. Просадка неизбежна, но в долгосрочной перспективе это выигрышная стратегия», — рекомендует управляющий. Сейчас еще рано заходить в подешевевшие бумаги, спорит Мкртчян. Он опасается, что ситуация на рынке только ухудшится. 

что произошло на самом деле — Рамблер/субботний

Фото: Русская семерка

Многим 1990-е годы запомнились как время финансовых пирамид: МММ, «Властилина», Хопёр-инвест, гербалайф… Но самую большую пирамиду организовало российское государство, выпуская государственные краткосрочные обязательства — облигации федерального займа, ГКО-ОФЗ. Некоторые считают виновным в дефолте Сергея Кириенко, объявившего о нём. Но он не более чем гонец, принёсший плохую весть. Заглянем же в машинное отделение и поймём, как сработал механизм, приведший к дефолту.

Экономическая ситуация в России

Хотелось бы заметить, что неправильно определять кризис словом «дефолт», так как этот термин обозначает не более чем отказ от выполнения финансовых обязательств. Но именно дефолт стал спусковым крючком для последовавшего кризиса. Начало 90-х в России характеризуется гиперинфляцией, достигавшей сотен процентов в год.

Ситуацию осложняла необходимость выплаты Россией внешнего долга, унаследованного от СССР. Договор о правопреемстве в отношении внешнего государственного долга и активов СССР был подписан в Москве 4 декабря 1991 года, он определял долю РФ в долге в 61,34%.

По состоянию на 1 января 1992 года внешний долг Советского Союза определён в $123,8 млрд, пишет Егор Гайдар в книге «Гибель империи». Именно он в июне-декабре 1992 года занимал пост и. о. премьер-министра России, так что в курсе, что да как. Россия нуждалась в неинфляционном источнике капитала. Кто и как предложил выпускать ГКО-ОФЗ, до сих пор неизвестно. Но финансовый инструмент был принят «на ура», когда был запущен в 1993 году.

По данным издания «Рынок ценных бумаг», инвесторы за пятилетку (1993-1998) заработали на ГКО-ОФЗ порядка $28,9 млрд Бал правили иностранцы. Государство эмитировало ГКО-ОФЗ со скоростью пулемёта, от 80% до 100% рынка государственных ценных бумаг занимал именно этот инструмент. Государство не задумывалось о последствиях, погашая обязательства по предыдущим выпускам деньгами от последующих.

Не считая первый год хождения ГКО-ОФЗ, в последующие годы средний объём выпуска облигаций составлял $50 млрд, что было выше годового бюджета страны даже по курсу тех лет. Макроэкономика начала выправляться. Настолько, что в 1997 году ЦБ РФ провёл деноминацию и снова ввёл в оборот монету в 1 копейку. Инфляция снизилась с 197% в 1995 году до 14% в 1997 году. Финансовый дефицит России упал вдвое: 11% ВВП в 1994 году и меньше чем к 5% ВВП в 1995 году.

Как всё рухнуло

Но тут Россию подвела макроэкономика. Начали пикировать мировые цены на сырьевые товары и нефть, продажа которых являлась основным источником поступления валюты в бюджет России. В IV квартале 1997 года рыночные настроения резко ухудшились в результате азиатского кризиса, разразившегося в июле 1997 года и захватившего не только всю Юго-Восточную Азию, но и волнами разошедшегося по миру. В результате иностранные инвесторы стали покупать меньше ГКО-ОФЗ, приток денег иссяк.

В 1994-1997 годах на первичных аукционах обычно размещалось 80%-95% эмиссии, в 1998 году — порядка 20%-40%, говорят данные ММВБ, ЦБ и АК&M. Пришлось покрывать обязательства из госбюджета, а он и без того был дефицитным. В ноябре 1997 года российский рубль подвергся спекулятивной атаке. Центробанк России защитил стоимость валюты, потеряв почти $6 млрд в валютных резервах, которые упали с $23,1 млрд в III квартале 1997 года до $17,8 млрд в IV квартале того же года. Стало понятно, что музыке играть недолго. Не спас ситуацию даже полученный в 1998 году кредит от МВФ в более чем $4 млрд — деньги были нужны на многое, не только на погашение обязательств по ГКО-ОФЗ. И российское правительство пошло на меру, за 80 лет до этого применённую большевиками, — отказ от выплат, объявив 17 августа 1998 года дефолт. В августе 1998 года заморозили ГКО на сумму около $37 млрд по номиналу или $29 млрд по цене размещения.

Иностранные инвесторы лихорадочно выводили капиталы с российского рынка, крупные корпорации сворачивали бизнес. Но зафиксировать потери и уйти успели не все. Например, хедж-фонд Long-Term Capital Management увяз так глубоко, что объявил о банкротстве. Не спасло даже наличие в правлении нескольких лауреатов Нобелевской премии по экономике.

Кириенко подал в отставку 23 августа, его место занял Черномырдин. В течение месяца ушло в отставку руководство ЦБ. Наталия Орлова, главный экономист Альфа-банка, руководитель Центра макроэкономического анализа, считает, что дефолт был неизбежен и экономика страны балансировала на его грани на протяжении 1991-1997 годов: «Падение цен на нефть в 1998 году просто сделало невозможным дальнейшее расширение долговой пирамиды, но сам дефолт был предопределён огромным объёмом унаследованных долгов и глубиной экономического кризиса начала 1990-х».

В целом российская экономика сжалась на 5%. Глубокая девальвация рубля повысила конкурентоспособность экономики России, а освободившиеся от иностранцев рыночные ниши дали возможность расти отечественному бизнесу. Орлова говорит, что тяжесть восприятия дефолта связана с тем, что он стал завершающим аккордом в непрерывном экономическом спаде 90-х годов. Рост на 1% был зафиксирован только в 1997 году, но положение не спас.

Видео дня. Что стало с первыми животными, полетевшими в космос

90000 Another Default Possible in Russia 90001 90002 90003 Saving money in someone else’s pockets is a very interesting thing to do 90004 90005 90006 90007 Five years since the Russian financial default (when Sergey Kiriyenko was the prime minister) — this is the date that no one wants to celebrate. However, a lot of serious specialists have been talking about a possibility of a new default in Russia. The default is dead — long live the default! 90005 90007 The story started when the government decided to play the game of a financial pyramid — the affair was connected with state treasury liabilities.The state was borrowing money from firms and private persons, paying a high interest yield to them. The interest was very high, and several serious economists predicted, the affair would end very soon. Indeed, one had to invest money in a very lucrative business to hope to have it back with a very good interest. 90005 90007 The government was desperately borrowing money, trying to save the collapsing budget. The result was becoming more and more clear with every day. Sergey Mavrodi, founder of the notorious Russian pyramid MMM, gave a very precise forecast on the issue — just two weeks before August 17th, 1998, when the ruble collapsed.90005 90007 Certain naive politicians were hoping for a five-billion-dollar loan from the IMF, which had been given to Russia to stabilize the financial situation. However, the Russian government had other views regarding the loan. Twenty-four hours before the announcement of the default, Boris Yeltsin signed decree 308 (the president signed the document in his country house), that ordered to transfer the IMF’s loan to the Central Bank «without transferring the funds on the accounts of the Russian Finance Ministry.»That document still horrifies specialists. Finance Ministry’s accounts have certain fixed codes. Every ruble that is transferred from or on those accounts is profoundly controlled. When the money is transferred to the Central Bank, it becomes a part of a big pile of money, and it is practically impossible to trace it afterwards. Those five billion dollars are still missing, although they could have eased the economic disaster at that period of time. Moreover, it is not the Russian government that is searching for the billions — Swiss prosecutors are .Domestic VIPs do not deal with such «things of little importance.» The then president became a pensioner, having found himself a member of a special group of people who enjoyed the legal immunity. The then prime minister, the «godfather» of the default, became an envoy of the incumbent president in a specially established administrative district. 90005 90007 One may continue with the list on and on, but the essence is clear: almost the entire «vertical of power» that existed in Russia in August of тисячі дев’ятсот дев’яносто вісім still rules the country now.No one was punished for the default. It is not impossibe that there could be a repeat of 1998 — the temptation has always been there. It seems that Russian officials can not do anything but cut the Russian budget and assets. This is their mission and talent, they would agree to bury it only in London, in Switzerland, or in Bahamian or Caribbean offshores. Russia apparently is not good for investments, from officials ‘point of view. 90005 90007 The Russian government de jure pronounced the principle to separate the economy from the state, although de facto it looks as follows: officials ‘have rights to obtain profits from the national product, but they are not responsible for its volume and the structural development whatsoever .No one takes seriously the talks about the doubling of the GDP over ten years: it would be naive to expect such an accomplishment from the Russian economy. 90005 90007 About 80 percent of Russia’s reserve funds — more than $ 64 billion — are being currently stored in foreign banks in the form of the US Treasury liabilities and other «stocks.» Russian money is working for Americans. Saving money in someone else’s pockets is a very interesting thing to do. Do Kremlin officials know what is going to happen, if they attempt to invest that money in Russia? It would be enough to recollect the events of the year 1917.The world’s largest country had a self-sufficient economy and the richest gold reserve. The national currency was converted on the base of the gold standard. As a result, the foreign capital started developing the Russian national wealth very actively, and the golden money started flowing abroad. Then the country experienced a «small» revolution. Sly people advised the country’s ruler to transfer gold reserves to foreign banks to get out of harm’s way. The interest was saved for six years, then there was a world war, a «bigger» revolution, the collapse of the state, the execution of the Tsar.Western banks simply appropriated the Russian gold — towards the debt and their citizens ‘losses. 90005 90007 Is there a need to repeat history? A «small» revolution in the form of the default took place in August of 1998. The golden reserve has been taken abroad too. One shall assume, one should prepare for a «bigger revolution» to happen. Probably, the affair with five billion dollars will pale in comparison. 90005 90007 90003 Nikolay Konkov 90004 90005 .90000 THE RUSSIAN DEFAULT — WHAT HAPPENED? 90001 90002 The Russian financial crisis and eventual default is often cited as a counterargument to one of the principle MR ideas that a sovereign currency issuer should not be able to go bankrupt. It’s a complex subject that is worth spending some time on. 90003 90002 Russia was a rather unique situation. Most people who study the Russian default are fixated on the fact that Russia defaulted on their debt. They focus almost entirely on the ultimate cause of death without actually studying what led to the default.This is similar to studying a man who dies of a heart attack and concluding that his bad heart was what was wrong with him. And while that might be true, a more thorough examination is likely to show you that a series of things (diet, smoking, lack of exercise, etc) actually led to broad problems that ultimately culminated in a heart attack. This lack of analysis leads many observers to conclude that Russia had too much debt, defaulted, end of story. This sort of simple analysis leads to simple conclusions which leads to misconceptions.The truth, as is generally the case, is more complex. 90003 90002 When one looks at the history of Russia you actually find many similarities with my conclusions in «Hyperinflation — It’s More Than Just a Monetary Phenomenon». In the case of Russia, we actually have many of the same elements leading to hyperinflation and then default. In this particular case, we have loss of a war, regime change, collapse of the tax system, political corruption, foreign denominated debts and collapse of productivity.In other words, from an MR perspective, this country was ripe for self destruction as they met almost all of the criteria that precede a hyperinflation and / or crisis resulting from ceding of monetary sovereignty. 90003 90002 I do not have nearly the time or the space to cover the sequence of events in its entirety, but it’s important to understand that Russia’s eventual hyperinflation and 1998 default is actually rooted in the break-up of the USSR which occurred in тисячі дев’ятсот дев’яносто один. The dissolution of the USSR was the largest dissolution of any socialist state and resulted in 15 sovereign states.Russia was the surviving state formerly known as the USSR and the burden that accompanied this was extraordinary. As you can imagine, the collapse of one of the worlds super powers was highly traumatic as the government and its people attempted to transition. Here we have the first two common elements in hyperinflations — loss of a war & regime change. The third crucial element was foreign denominated debts from their Soviet predecessors. How problematic was this? Pravda explains how Russia only just managed to pay off this heavy burden a few years ago: 90003 90010 90011 «The Soviet Union left a huge debt after its collapse.Russia became the only country to inherit not only the foreign property of the former USSR, but all of its foreign debts as well. It was extremely hard for Russia to serve the debt because the economy was declining steadily in the beginning of the 1990s. The Soviet debt had been restructured four times before the default of 1998. By 1999 Russia managed to either write off or delay the payments to private creditors (the London Club, for instance). However, such a compromise proved to be impossible with the Paris Club of Creditors.»90003 90013 90011 From an MR perspective, the story essentially concludes itself right there. This country was never truly sovereign because it was essentially a currency user when the new regime was established and Russia was saddled with the foreign denominated debts of the old USSR. In other words, ceding your monetary sovereignty proved disastrous as we’re now seeing in Europe. But there’s actually more to it than just that. Their errors multiplied as the years went on. 90003 90011 Many analysts and critics of the Russian default like to imply that Russia was simply spending uncontrollably and that their default is an excess of spending and government largess.But that’s not exactly accurate. Turmoil in the regime change and political disunity made tax collections increasingly difficult as the new regime took control. The St Louis Fed cites corruption and the drop in tax collections as the primary cause of the ballooning deficit: 90003 90010 90002 «Another weakness in the Russian economy was low tax collection, which caused the public sector deficit to remain high. The majority of tax revenues came from taxes that were shared between the regional and federal governments, which fostered competition among the different levels of government over the distribution.According to Shleifer and Treisman (2000), this kind of tax sharing can result in conflicting incentives for regional governments and lead them to help firms conceal part of their taxable profit from the federal government in order to reduce the firms ‘total tax payments. In return, the firm would then make transfers to the accommodating regional government. » 90003 90013 90002 The country would eventually go to the IMF in 1996 seeking aid. This further relinquished their sovereignty. All the while, inflation was ravaging the country leading to unrest and increased economic turmoil.Their rolling hyperinflation leftover from the trauma of the collapse of the USSR never really ended. Even into the late 90’s the country suffered from high double digit inflation: 90003 90002 90025 90003 90002 The lack of economic diversity (their economy was highly dependent on oil exports) and foreign denominated debts made it vital that they grow via their trade surplus. In attempting to achieve this the country further ceded sovereignty by implementing a peg to the US Dollar. Further, in 1998 the Russian government cited the tax issue as a serious risk to the regime.They attempted a complete overhaul of the tax system, but the damage had already been done. As the Asian Crisis erupted in the late 90’s the fragility of the Russian economy was exposed. The government attempted to protect the Ruble during the crisis leading to massive hemorrhaging of FX reserves. In a 1998 paper Warren Mosler explained the impact of this policy: 90003 90010 90002 «The marginal holder of ANY ruble bank deposit, at any Russian bank, had a choice of three options before the close of business each day.90003 90002 (I will assume all rubles are in the banking system. Actual cash is unnecessary for the point I am making in this example.) 90003 90002 The three choices are: 90003 90010 90002 Hold rubles in a clearing account at the Central Bank 90003 90002 Exchange ruble clearing balances for something else at the CB. 90003 90010 90002 Buy a Russian GKO (tsy sec), which is an interest bearing account at the CB 90003 90002 b. Exchange rubles for $ at the official rate at the CB 90003 90013 90013 90002 For all practical purposes, 2a and 2b competed with each other.Russia had to offer high enough rates on its GKOs to compete with option 2b. In that sense interest rates were endogenous. Any attempt by the Russian Central Bank to lower rates, such as open market operations, would result in an outflow of $ US reserves. The conditions for a stable ruble could not coexist. The net desire to save rubles was probably negative, the failure to enforce tax liabilities resulted in deficit spending even as the government tried to reduce spending, and the higher interest rate on GKO’s increased government spending even more.90003 90002 At the time GKO rates were around 150% annually, and the interest payments themselves constituted at least the entire ruble budget deficit. It seemed to me that higher rates of interest were the driving factor behind the excess ruble spending which led to the loss of $ US reserves. 90003 90002 With the $ in high demand due to a variety of factors, such as domestic taxed advantaged $ US savings plans, insurance reserves, pension funds, and the like, and, exacerbating the situation, what could be called overly tight US fiscal policy, there was, for all practical purposes, no GKO interest rate that could stem the outflow of $ US reserves.90003 90002 The main source of $ reserves was, of course, $ loans from both the international private sector and international agencies such as the IMF. The ruble was overvalued as evidenced by the fact that $ reserves went out nearly as fast as they became available. The Russian Treasury responded by offering higher and higher rates on its GKO securities to compete with option 2b, without success. This inability to compete with option 2b is what finally leads to devaluation under a fixed exchange rate regime.»90003 90013 90002 But that was not all. The global economy began to decline sharply as the Asian Financial Crisis unfolded in 1998. Russia was particularly hard hit as the oil and non-ferrous metals markets collapsed. The shock was enough to drive investors to believe that the Ruble would be massively devalued or debts would be defaulted on. In other words, Russia was built on a poor foundation and then driven into the ground as a series of events battered their economy and government. 90003 90002 In sum, you had a nearly perfect environment for a major economic calamity.And like my study of past hyperinflations, we find that the Russian default was actually much more than just a monetary phenomenon. In fact, it was rooted in much more devastating and complex issues than merely running high sovereign debts. The primary causes include regime change, loss of a war, foreign denominated debt and loss of monetary sovereignty via a pegged currency. 90003 90002 90062 N.B. — 90063 It should go without saying that this situation is not even remotely analogous to the current situation in the USA.90003 90002 90062 Addendum 90063 — A brief note on willingness to pay via Warren Mosler: 90003 90010 90002 «An extreme example is Russia in August 1998. The ruble was convertible into $ US at the Russian Central Bank at the rate of 6.45 rubles per $ US. The Russian government, desirous of maintaining this fixed exchange rate policy, was limited in its WILLINGNESS to pay by its holdings of $ US reserves, since even at very high interest rates holders of rubles desired to exchange them for $ US at the Russian Central Bank .Facing declining $ US reserves, and unable to obtain additional reserves in international markets, convertibility was suspended around mid August, and the Russian Central Bank has no choice but to allow the ruble to float. 90003 90002 All throughout this process, the Russian Government had the ABILITY to pay in rubles. However, due to its choice of fixing the exchange rate at level above ‘market levels’ it was not, in mid August, WILLING to make payments in rubles. In fact, even after floating the ruble, when payment could have been made without losing reserves, the Russian Government, which included the Treasury and Central Bank, continued to be UNWILLING to make payments in rubles when due, both domestically and internationally.It defaulted on ruble payment BY CHOICE, as it always possessed the ABILITY to pay simply by crediting the appropriate accounts with rubles at the Central Bank. 90003 90002 Why Russia made this choice is the subject of much debate. However, there is no debate over the fact that Russia had the ABILITY to meet its notional ruble obligations but was UNWILLING to pay and instead CHOSE to default. «90003 90013 .90000 No chance of state default in Russia — Deputy PM — RT Business News 90001 90002 There is no chance of a default on a state level in Russia, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich told RT at World Economic Forum in Switzerland, adding that the government will fulfill its obligations. 90003 90002 90005 «There are no chances of a default on a state level — the government will fulfill its obligations, «90006 Dvorkovich said in an interview to RT Wednesday. 90005 «With regard to the corporate level — it’s a market and of course some defaults are possible.Somewhere they will be technical; somewhere there will be serious problems. But the vast majority of strategic companies will cope with their problems — on their own or with the state’s help. » 90006 90003 90002 READ MORE: Super rich gather in Davos to tackle shrinking economy 90003 90002 Russia’s economic woes have caused Western rating agencies cut the country’s debt rating to just a notch above junk status, with the fear they could put Russia to a non-investment category soon.Rating downgrades are a political issue, says Dvorkovich. It is clear there are objectively greater risks to the Russian economy and a negative forecast is possible. 90003 90002 90005 «They had the right to do it, but no way can a downgrade to speculative level be justified, «90006 he said. 90005 «Russia is a strong country, we have a solid financial system, we have successful companies. We have no grounds for large-scale defaults, these estimates are exaggerated. » 90006 90003 90002 READ MORE: Fitch downgrade will have ‘limited’ effect on Russia 90003 90002 On Wednesday, Iraq’s oil minister Adel Abdul Mahdi said in Davos that oil prices have hit bottom and are not expected to drop further.Oil prices have fallen nearly 60 percent since June 2014 року, both WTI and Brent benchmarks are below $ 50. 90003 90002 On the issue, Dvorkovich said that the 90005 «period of low prices may last for some time, but the prices should return to the normal level. » 90006 He elaborated that of course they will not return to $ 110 per barrel, but he expects the prices to stabilize between $ 60 and $ 80. 90003 90002 Talking about the ongoing ruble crisis, Dvorkovich said one of the essential steps is to restore the trust in the national currency.90003 90002 90005 «There are two main factors in monetary policy: the fundamental reasons for changing the course. In our case they are evident, «90006 said Dvorkovich. 90005 «It’s a low price for basic commodities, oil and gas. Another factor is associated with trust in the national currency. » 90006 90003 90002 Since oil prices are gradually stabilizing, the trust factor prevails. If it’s restored, the currency will no longer see such storms in its exchange rate. 90005 «Then there’ll be no fear of further fluctuations.This is what both the government and the central bank are currently engaged in, «90006 he said. 90003 90002 Negative growth in Russia is possible, but the experience of 2009 has shown that the country has every chance to quickly overcome difficulties and restore positive growth within a year, said Dvorkovich. 90003 90002 90005 «We will try to avoid recession this year, although, of course, a lot is working against us. But even if we will not be able to do this, we are sure that there are enough instruments of economic policy to ensure positive growth in the coming years, «90006 he said.90003 90002 The sanctions imposed by the west have become another reason why the Russian economy is facing complexities. Such measures have always reflected negatively on the economies against which they were imposed, on the economies which imposed sanctions, and on neighboring countries. However, Dvorkovich believes, the goal pursued by the West is impossible to achieve. 90003 90002 90005 «There are difficulties with financing investments, difficulties with implementing specific technological initiatives and projects, but we seek for alternatives, we find other partners, including in the Asia-Pacific region, and are still moving forward, «90006 he said.90005 «Therefore, despite the sanctions, we are looking for every opportunity to improve efficiency and increase our growth potential. » 90006 90003 90002 The country has accumulated substantial reserves in case of hard times, and part of them will be used to fully ensure that the government fulfills its social obligations on a number of priority projects and trends in the field of security, agriculture and in many other areas. However, less efficient spending of lower priority will be reduced, Dvorkovich said.90003 90002 90005 «Such instructions were given; the ministries have prepared a proposal, and in the coming weeks the final decision on what costs will be reduced by about 10-15 percent in different fields, will be accepted, «90006 he said. 90005 «I hope that Parliament will support us, and we will move forward more modestly, but, nevertheless, in a situation with public finances absolutely normal for this period. » 90006 90003.90000 Russian Bond Default / Ruble Collapse — Financial Scandals, Scoundrels & Crises 90001 90002 Central Bank of Russia. «International Reserves of the Russian Federation». 90003 90002 Chiodo, Abbigail, and Michael Owyang. 2002. «A Case Study of a Currency Crisis: The Russian Default of 1998.» Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (November / December). 90003 90002 Chance, Clifford.»Chronology of the Russian Financial Crisis 1998.» American Russian Law Institute. 90003 90002 Dabrowski, Marek. 1995. «The Reasons of the Collapse of the Ruble Zone.» CASE Research Foundation, Center for Social & Economic Research, Warsaw (November). 90003 90002 Dungey, Mardi, Renee Fry, Brenda Gonzalez-Hermosillo, and Vance Martin. 2002. «International Contagion Effects from the Russian Crisis and the LTCM Near Collapse.»International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP / 02/74 (April). 90003 90002 Fischer, Stanley. «The Russian Economy at the Start of 1998.» International Monetary Fund. 90003 90002 Gilman, Martin. 2010. 90015 No Precedent, No Plan: Inside Russia’s 1998 Default 90016. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 90003 90002 Nadmitov, Alexander.2004. 90015 Russian Debt Restructuring: Overview, Structure of Debt, Lessons of Default, Seizure Problems and the IMF SDRM Proposal 90016. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School. 90003 90002 Odling-Smee, John. «The IMF and Russia in the 1990’s.» International Monetary Fund. 2004. 90003 90002 Perotti, Enrico. 2002. «Lessons from the Russian Meltdown: The Economics of Soft Legal Constraints.»90015 International Finance 90016, vol. 5, no. 3 (November). 90003 90002 Pinto, Brian; Khara, Homi; Ulatov, Sergei. «An Analysis of Russia’s +1998 Meltdown: Fundamentals and Market Signals.» Brookings Institute; World Bank. January, 2001. 90003 90002 Pinto, Brian, and Sergei Ulatov. 2010. «Financial Globalization and the Russian Crisis of 1998.» World Bank.Policy Research Working Paper 5312 (May). 90003 90002 Popov, Vladimir. 2000. «Lessons of the Currency Crisis in Russia and in Other Countries.» 90015 Problems of Economic Transition 90016, vol. 43, no.1: 45-73. 90003 90002 Quandl. «Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, Daily». 90003 90002 Roche, Cullen.»The Russian Default — What Happened?» Pragmatic Capitalism. 12 December 2011. 90003 90002 «Russia lets ruble fall.» 1998. 90015 CNN Money 90016 (17 August). 90003 90002 «Russian Bonds Hit Default Levels as Meltdown Looms.» 1998. 90015 Euroweek 90016 (14 August). 90003 90002 «The Russian Crisis тисячу дев’ятсот дев’яносто вісім.»Rabobank. 16 September, 2013. 90003 90002 «Timeline of the panic.» 90015 Frontline 90016. 90003 .